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In research conducted over the  last decade and a half, Yujiro Hayami
and I have outlined a model of economic development  in which both technical
and institutional change were  treated as  largely endogenous to  the  economic
system.1  Technical change is  treated as  induced by changes in factor
supplies and product demand and by institutional change.  Institutional
change  is  treated as  induced by changes  in factor supplies and product
demand and by technical change.  Advances  in natural science knowledge
reduce the cost of technical change and advances  in social science knowledge
reduce  the cost of institutional change.  This induced innovation model was
tested against historical experience  in both developed and developing
countries.  The tests  of the  induced technical change hypothesis were much
more rigorous than the  tests of the  induced institutional change hypothesis.
A Pattern Model
We have also made some preliminary suggestions concerning the
relationships between cultural endowments and technical and institutional
change. 2  The pattern model that we used to map the general equilibrium
relationships between resource  endowments, cultural endowments, technology
and institutions  is reproduced here as  Figure 1.  The model suggests  the
importance of going beyond the  conventional general equilibrium model in
which resource endowments,  technologies,  institutions and culture  are
treated as  given.  In the  study of long-term social and economic change theThe  formal microeconomic models used in  the Hayami-Ruttan work and in the
work of others  to  analyze the  supply and demand for technical and
institutional change can be  thought of as  "nested" within the general
equilibrium framework of Figure 1.
One advantage of the "pattern  model" outlined in Figure 1 is  that  it
helps to  identify areas of ignorance.  Our capacity to model and test  the
relationships between resource endowments and technical  change  is  relatively
strong.  Our capacity to model and test the relationships between cultural
endowments  and either technical or institutional change is  relatively weak.
A second advantage of the model is  that it  is useful in identifying the
components that enter into  other attempts to account for secular economic
and social change.  Failure  to analyze historical  change  in a general
equilibrium context  tends to  result in a unidimensional perspective on the
relationships bearing on technical  and institutional change.
For example, historians working within the Marxist tradition often tend
to view technical change as  dominating both institutional and cultural
change.  In his book Oriental Despotism, Karl Wittfogel views the  irrigation
technology used in wet rice  cultivation in East Asia as determining
political organization.3  As  it applies  to Figure 1, his primary emphasis
was  on the  impact of resources and technology on institutions  (B) and (C).
A serious misunderstanding can be observed in contemporary neo-Marxian
critiques of  the green revolution.  These criticisms have focused attention
almost entirely on the  impact of technical change on labor and land tenure
relations.  Both the  radical and populist critics have  emphasized relation
(B).  But they have tended to  ignore relationships  (A) and (C).  This bias
has led to  repeated failure to  identify effectively the  separate effects ofpopulation growth and technical change  on the growth and distribution of
income.
The analytical power of the more complete induced innovation model is
illustrated in the Laguna Village  (Philippines) study by Yujiro Hayami and
Masao Kikuchi.4  In Laguna increases  in population pressure  (C)  and
technical change in rice production (B)  resulted in substantial change in
both land tenure  and labor market relationships between the mid 1950's  and
the mid 1970's.
Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz identify a primary function of
property rights  as  guiding incentives  to achieve  greater internalization of
externalities. 5  They consider  that the  clear specification of property
rights  reduces  transaction costs  in  the face of growing competition for the
use of scarce resources  as a result  of population growth and/or growth in
product demand.  Douglass North and Robert P. Thomas, building on the
Alchian-Demsetz paradigm, attempted to explain the economic  growth of
western Europe between 900 and 1700 primarily in terms of changes in
property institutions. 6  During the eleventh and thirteenth centuries the
pressure of population against increasingly scarce  land resources  induced
innovations  in property rights  that  in turn created profitable opportunities
for  the  generation and adoption of labor-intensive  technical changes  in
agriculture.  The population decline  in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries was viewed as  a primary factor leading to  the demise of  feudalism
and the  rise of  the national  state  (line  C).  These institutional changes  in
turn opened up new possibilities  for economies of scale  in nonagricultural
production and in trade  (line b).In a more recent work, Mancur Olson has emphasized the proliferation of
institutions as a source of economic decline. 7  He also regards broad-based
encompassing organizations as having incentives to generate  growth and
redistribute  incomes  to  their members with little excess burden.  For
example,  a broadly based coalition that encompasses  the majority of
agricultural producers  is  more likely to exert political pressure for
growth-oriented policies that will enable  its members  to  obtain a larger
share of a larger national product than a smaller organization that
represents  the interests  of the producers of a single commodity.  Small
organizations representing narrow interest groups are more  likely to pursue
the  interests  of their members  at the expense of the welfare of other
producers and the general public.  In contrast, an even more broadly based
farmer-labor coalition would be more concerned with promoting economic
growth than would an organization representing a single sector.  But large
groups,  in  Olson's view, are inherently unstable because rational
individuals will tend not to  incur the costs  of contributing to  the
realization of the  large group program --  they have strong incentives  to act
as  free  riders.  As  a  result,  organizational  "space"  in  a  stable  society
will be  increasingly occupied by special interest "distributional
coalitions."  These distributional coalitions make political life divisive.
They slow down the adoption of new technologies  (line b) and limit the
capacity to  reallocate resources  (line c).  The effect  is  to  slow down
economic growth or  in some cases initiate  a period of economic decline.
4Cultural Endowments in Development Economics
While  substantial progress has been made  (in economics at  least) within
a partial equilibrium framework to analyze  the  sources and impact of
technical and institutional change, almost no attention has been devoted by
economists  to the  role of cultural endowments.  To the  extent that cultural
endowments are considered at all by economists they tend to be subsumed
under the concept of tastes.  And tastes, even more so than technology and
institutions, are traditionally regarded as not  subject to economic
analysis.8
At an  intuitive level we have  little difficulty in accepting the view
that cultural endowments,  including religion and ideology, exert at least
some  influence on the  supply of  institutional innovation.  Cultural
endowments make some  forms of  institutional change less  costly to establish
and impose severe costs on others.
It has been argued, for example,  that the  traditional moral obligation
in the Japanese village community to cooperate  in communal  infrastructure
maintenance has made it less costly to  implement rural development programs
than in societies  lacking such traditions.9  The traditional patterns of
cooperation have represented an important cultural resource  on which to
erect modern forms of cooperative marketing and joint farming activities.
In China, communist ideology, reinforced by the lessons learned during the
guerrilla period in Yenan, inspired the mobilization of communal resources
10
to build irrigation systems and other forms  of overhead capital.  Similar
cultural endowments are  not available in South Asian villages where, for
example, the  caste structure  inhibits  cooperation and encourages
specialization.In the  cases cited above, cultural endowments  acted to  shift the supply
of  institutional innovation to  the right -- to  reduce the cost of
institutional change.  In the development literature, cultural endowments
are more frequently viewed as obstacles  to technical or institutional
change.  Kusum Nair insists that the differential response to the green
revolution seed-fertilizer technology among regions  in India can be
explained, at least in part, on cultural grounds.1  Foster has argued that
indigenous  innovation in peasant societies is blocked by an "Image of
Limited Good"--"peasants view their social,  economic and natural universe--
their total environment--as  one  in which all of  the desired things  in life
such as  land, wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and honor,
respect and status, power and influence, security and safety exist  in a
finite quality and are always in short supply."12  It has been argued that a
primary explanation for British economic  decline over the  last century has
been a set of cultural changes associated with the  "gentrification" of
bourgeois culture--"the rooting of pseudoaristocratic attitudes and values
on upper-middle-class educated opinion shaped an unfavorable context for
economic  endeavor."3
The first post-war generation of development economists gave a
prominent role, at least at the rhetorical level,  to  the role of cultural
endowments  in constraining or  facilitating economic growth.  They accepted
the body of scholarship  in history, philosophy, anthropology, sociology and
political science  that insisted that cultural endowments exerted major
impact on behavior and hence on the response  in traditional societies  to  the
opportunities associated with the modernization of community life and the14 possibilities of national economic development.  Without attempting to be
exhaustive let me  refer to  the work of Bert F. Hoselitz, Everett E. Hagen,
Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Gunnar Myrdal and  P.T. Bauer.  I
emphasize the work of Hoselitz because of his  interdisciplinary
entrepreneurship;  Hagen because of his attempt to  develop a unified theory
of social change;  Adelman and Morris because of their effort to  quantify the
role of socio-cultural variables;  Myrdal because of his effort to  take
cultural variables explicitly into  account in development policy reform;  and
Bauer because of the  influence his work has had on current development
assistance policy.
Hoselitz
Burt F. Hoselitz played a particularly important entrepreneurial  role
in the  1950's  in urging economists to give  greater consideration to  the role
of cultural factors in economic development.  His activities  included the
organization of the  Center on Economic Development and Cultural Change at
the University of Chicago and the  founding of the Journal of Economic
Development and Cultural Change.  He authored and edited a number of
influential publications dealing with non-economic barriers to  economic
development.1  Among the non-economic factors  identified by Hoselitz in his
1952 article were:  (a) the emergence of cultural minorities or classes  that
serve as  the  spearhead for both technical  and institutional change;  (b)  a
social and political system that encourages a high degree of  social
mobility;  (c) a social and cultural environment that facilitates  the
development of institutions  capable of generating the technical and
institutional knowledge necessary to operate a modern society;  (d) theweakening of commitment to  traditional methods  of production and
institutions.
This last consideration was particulary  important in Hoselitz's view
since  traditional "value systems offer special resistance  to change.  . .
their change is  facilitated if  the material economic environment in which
they can flourish is destroyed or weakened...Economic  development plans
which combine industrialization with an extension of traditional  or near
traditional  forms of agriculture are  thus creating a dilemma which in the
long run may present serious repercussions  in the  speed or facility with
which ultimate objectives can be reached."16
Hagen
The most ambitious  attempt to  incorporate cultural variables  into the
analysis of economic development was  that of Everett E. Hagen.  Hagen argued
that advances  in the fields of anthropology, sociology, psychology and
economics had reached the point where a synthesis could be achieved to  form
17
a unified theory of society and social change.  He drew on the  literature
from these fields  to analyze  the development history of England, Japan,
Colombia, Indonesia, Burma and the  Sioux.
Hagen's analysis led him to place primary emphasis on personality
formation.  He argued that the interrelationships between personality
formation and social structure are  such that social change  could not occur
18
without prior or concurrent personality change.1  Such factors as  political
development, nationalization, religious  change, urbanization, infrastructure
development, and commercial innovation are "primarily incidents in the
process of change but not initial causal factors  in change."19Traditional societies were characterized by authoritarian personality.
"The image of  the world...includes  a perception of uncontrollable
forces...Each individual finds his place  in the  authoritarian hierarchy of
20
human relationships...20  In his historical  studies Hagen gave particular
attention to  the emergence of personality characteristics conducive to
innovation.  In a retrospective review in 1980 Hagen argues that a
disproportional  share of entrepreneurs are drawn from social  groups that
21
were excluded from traditional elite roles.2  Hagen's work received
enthusiastic reviews.  But in retrospect  it must be seen as  the culmination
of an effort to enrich the  theory of development by drawing on anthropology,
sociology and psychology rather than as  the foundation for further advances.
Adelman and Morris
The most serious effort by economists  to obtain quantitative estimates
of association between socio-cultural variables and economic  development has
22
been by Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris.  Their approach, in their
1965  and 1967 work, has been to use factor analysis  techniques to compress a
large  set of  indicators into groups of closely associated socio-cultural,
23
political and economic  indicators  of the development process.2  Among the
indicators selected to  reflect change  in socio-cultural  endowments were  the
size of the  traditional agricultural sector, the extent of dualism, the
character  of  basic  social  organization, the extent of social mobility and
the  degree of ethnic homogeneity.  The analysis is performed first for a set
of seventy-four countries and then for three subsets classified by level of
development.  An attempt is  made to differentiate between long run and short
run patterns of association by performing the analysis  first without andthen with a group of economic variables which can be interpreted as  response
to short run policy interventions.
Adelman and Morris emphasize  that the  "relationships found between
levels of economic development and differences  in social  and political
structure are neither caused nor causal.  Rather they reflect the
interaction of an organic system of  institutional and behavioral change
which underlies the process  of economic development."24
But they do draw some fairly firm conclusions.  During the earliest
stage of development, cultural and social constraints  are a burden on
economic growth.  The socio-cultural environment must be transformed in
25 order to enlarge  the scope for economic activity.5  Furthermore,  their
research "suggests that one may look at the  entire process of national
modernization as  the progressive differentiation of the social, economic,
and political spheres from each other and the development of specialized
institutions and attitudes within each sphere.  More specifically, the
process of economic development in underdeveloped countries consists
basically of the separation of the economic sphere, first from the  complex
of social organization and the norms that govern it,  and, subsequently and
to a lesser extent, from the political environment by which it is
26
constrained.
Adelman and Morris suggest that the  appropriate policy mix will differ
depending on the  level of development.  At low levels of development the
growth of the market sector and the narrowing of dualism among sectors
should have high priority.  During an intermedial  level,  social  tensions
increase as  income distribution becomes more unequal.  At this stage
10political development that  is capable  of reducing stress among social
classes becomes particularly important.
Mvrdal
The most ambitious  effort by an economist to employ cultural variables
to  interpret economic behavior and to assess  the prospects for growth, and
to prescribe economic policy was  the massive study of South Asian
development by Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama:  An Inquiry into  the Poverty of
27
Nations.  Myrdal contrasts  the modernization ideals, which represent the
official ideology of a Westernized elite, with the traditional values of the
rest of society.  The official creed, held by the politically alert,
articulate  and active part of  the population, particularly by the
intellectuals, emphasized the values that,  in the West, were a product of
the Enlightenment--rationality, equity, efficiency, diligence, honesty,
innovation, national  independence, democracy, social disciplines. 28
Although Myrdal  regards easy speculation regarding the impact of
personality, culture and religion as unscientific, his  research leads him to
the view that the people of  South Asia "have lived for  a long time under
conditions very different from those  in the Western world and this has left
its  mark upon their bodies  and minds.  Religion has, then, become  the
emotional container of this whole way of life  and work and by its  sanction
29
has rendered it  rigid and resistent to  change."  Popular  religion
sanctifies a whole  system of life and work, attitudes and institutions,  that
contribute to  "the resistance  of that system to planned, induced changes
30
along the  lines  of the modernization ideal."  But this weight of social
and political inertia must be overcome by planned development.
11But planning and plan implementation in South Asia are  inhibited by
political limitations that Myrdal labels as  the  "soft state."  Policies
decided on are not enforced.  The authorities are reluctant to  place
obligations on people.  "Planning for development requires a readiness to
place obligations on people  in all social strata to  a much greater extent
than is  done in any of the  South Asian countries...Under present South Asian
conditions development cannot be achieved without much more social
discipline than the prevailing interpretation of democracy in the  region
31 permits."  At times Myrdal comes close to  implying that economic
development  in South Asia can only be  achieved by an authoritarian socialist
regime--but without Stalin or Mao.  In a  retrospective view, published in
1984, Myrdal still regards the  failure of the  "soft state"  to  achieve
32 internal reforms as a  major obstacle to  development.32
Bauer
The role of cultural  endowments in economic development has also been a
consistent theme in the work of P.  T. Bauer.  Bauer has  insisted, and
continues to  insist, that successful development in poor countries has not
been the result of "the forced mobilization of their resources.  Nor was it
the result of forcible modernization of attitudes and behavior, nor of
large-scale state-sponsored industrialization, nor of any other form of big
push.  And it was not brought about by the achievement of political
independence,  ...  or by any other form of political or cultural
revolution."33
Bauer does  insist that economic  achievement and progress "depend
largely on human aptitude and attitudes,  on social and political
institutions and arrangements  ..., on historical experience and to  a lesser
12extent on external contact, market opportunities and natural resources." 34
Cultural  endowments, reflected in differences among ethnic groups, have been
particularly emphasized by Bauer.  He has repeatedly drawn on his  early
studies  in Southeast Asia.
"Many rubber estates kept  records of the daily output of each tapper,
and distinguished between the  output of the Chinese and Indian workers.  The
output of the  Chinese was usually more than double  that of  the Indians, with
all of  them using the  same equipment of tapping knife, latex cup,  and
bucket.  There were  similar or even wider differences between Chinese,
Indian and Malay smallholders....  The pronounced differences between Chinese
and Indians could not be attributed to the  special characteristics often
possessed by migrants, as both groups were recent immigrants.  The great
majority of both Indians  and Chinese were uneducated coolies,  so that  the
differences  in their performance  could not be explained in terms of
differences  in human capital formation.  ... I  was to  encounter similar
phenomena in West Africa, in the Levant,  in India, and elsewhere ...
differences  in economic performance among different cultural groups as  a
feature of much of economic history...3
Bauer's perspective has not been reinforced by new investigations.  It
has retained its  currency through frequent repetition.  Myrdal  and Bauer
share remarkably similar views on the  role of cultural constraints on
economic development.  This does not lead them to  similar views on
development policy.  Myrdal's enthusiasm for strong state intervention is
countered by Bauer's faith in market forces.
In spite  of the wide attention that each of the five bodies of work
reviewed in this  section has  received, their work has not been incorporated
13into mainstream economics or economic development thought.  Professional
opinion in economics has not dealt kindly with the  reputations of those
development economists who have made serious efforts  to incorporate cultural
variables into development  theory or  into the analysis of the  development
process.  Their work has  typically been favorably reviewed and then ignored.
Their work has had wider currency outside  than within the field of economic
development.  There has been no rush by other scholars or by graduate
students  to  refine or test either their theory or their results.
A premature obituary to the  cultural endowments school was pronounced
36
by Albert 0. Hirschman in a 1965 article.  In his review Hirschman grouped
the  several cultural barriers referred to  in the  literature as  (a) obstacles
that turn into assets,  (b) obstacles whose elimination turns out to be
unnecessary, and (c)  obstacles whose elimination is postponable.  The
publication in 1963  of Transforming Traditional Agriculture by T. W.
Schultz, which shifted attention from peasant culture as  an obstacle to
development and set forth the  "poor but efficient" view of the peasant
cultivator in traditional societies, was even more influential  (though not
referred to by Hirschman) in turning  the attention of development economists
37
away from the  issue of cultural factors  in development.  But it was the
rapid adoption of green revolution agricultural  technology by peasant
producers throughout Asia that gave plausibility to  the Hirschman and
Schultz skepticism.
Experience has taught us,  over the last quarter century, that when
peasants  refuse  to adopt the practices recommended by agronomists and
economists,  it may be the experts rather  than the peasants who are
14wrong.  But in  spite of the  failure of research on the economic implications
of cultural endowments  to  find a secure place in economic development
literature or thought, the  conviction that "culture matters" remains
pervasive in the underworld of development thought and practice.  The fact
that the  scholars and practitioners of development are forced to deal with
cultural  endowments at an intuitive  level rather than in analytical terms
should be regarded as  a deficiency in professional capacity rather than as
evidence  that culture doesn't matter.
In the  1985 edition of Agricultural Development. Yujiro Hayami and I,
while  insisting on the potential significance of cultural endowments,  argued
that until  our colleagues  in the other social  sciences are able  to  provide
us with more helpful analytical tools,  economists are forced to adhere to a
strategy of exploring how far modest extensions of micro economic theory can
take us in the  analysis of both the  sources and impact of technical and
institutional change.38
Although I continue  to adhere  to a strategy  that one should first  try
to understand economic phenomena primarily in economic terms,  it may be  time
to  again assess what the advances  in the other social sciences might be  able
to  contribute to  a new generation of development economists that was not
available to  those  of us who began our work on economic development  in  the
1950's and 1960's.  In the next section of this paper I attempt  to  examine
some  of the potential contributions  from the field of anthropology.
Why Anthropology?
There are a number of reasons that one might look to  the  field of
anthropology for guidance in  attempting to understand the  sources and impact
of cultural endowments on economic development.  One  is  that anthropology
15has traditionally embraced a broad conception of culture.  The  term culture
was used by the early anthropologists such as Edward Bennet Taylor and Franz
Boas  "to designate the  totality of human social behavior that was
independent of the genetic constitution and biological characteristics of
1,39
organisms."  In this view, culture comprised the totality of inherited
artifacts, material goods,  technical processes,  and mental constructs.  Over
time, however, distinct traditions of physical and cultural anthropology
emerged.  Cultural  anthropology focused on the evolution and diffusion of
40
custom, social organization, values and ideology.4  Since the now classic
work of Firth  in the  1950's it has become common within anthropology to make
a distinction between organization and structure  that is  analytically
41
similar  to  the distinction between institution and culture in Figure 1.4
A second reason for looking to anthropology is  the large body of
ethnographic  studies that have become available since mid-century.  It is
the  insistence on descriptive realism that makes  the use  of these
ethnographic  studies so potentially attractive.  The descriptive detail
often makes  it possible for economists or other social  scientists to
42
reinterpret the original material.  Relatively few economists have been
willing to make the  investment in time needed to generate  the information
necessary to assure a reasonably adequate understanding of even economic
relationships at the village or community level.  Two important exceptions
are the Laguna studies by Hayami and Kikuchi and the  Palanpur studies by
Bliss and Stern.43
Ethnographic studies are now available  for many peasant and urban
communities as well  as  the primitive isolates that were the  traditional
focus  of anthropological research.  There are two major obstacles to  drawing
16on anthropology for an understanding of the  relationships between cultural
endowments and technical and institutional  change.  The first is that
ethnographic studies have, as  a result of a commitment to  learning primarily
through field work, often avoided embodying their interpretation either in a
44
historical context or in a contemporary political and economic context.
The  second obstacle  is  the  intellectual  fragmentations within the
discipline of anthropology.  The economist who  attempts to  "read
anthropology" is confronted by many anthropologies:  "British functionalism,
French structuralism, cultural ecology, and psychological anthropology;
efforts  to synthesize Marxist approaches with structuralism, semiotics,  and
other forms of symbolic  analysis;  efforts to establish more encompassing
frameworks of explanation such as  sociobiology to achieve  the aim of a more
fully "scientific"  anthropology;  efforts to merge the  influential study of
language  in anthropology with the concerns of social theory."45
In spite of  its fractionated appearance it  is  possible  to make a
separation, perhaps somewhat oversimplified, between the  several
"materialist" and "interpretive" schools of anthropology.  The
materialists' perspective  interprets differences  in social  life and behavior
as  arising out of universal physiological, economic and political concerns.
The culture theory and symbolic anthropologists argue for a deeper study of
the meaning of life and the importance of interpreting behavior in terms
47
that are significant to the society being studied.  In the next sections I
draw particularly on the work of Marvin Harris and Marshall Sahlins as
representatives of the materialist and interpretive schools because the
polemical style employed in their recent work has helped to  sharpen the
issues  that  I want to  examine.
17Materialist Perspectives
Because of  the pervasive role played by resource endowments and self
interest in economic analysis, the materialist approaches seem, at first
instance, more congenial  to economists.  There is a strong (fossilized)
tradition of historical materialism in anthropology.4  In this  tradition,
culture  (superstructure) is viewed as so  largely determined by the forces
and relations of production (Figure 2) that  it offers  little in the way of
insight or additional analytical power to  economists.  Little weight can be
given to  cultural differences  in a world that  is inevitably moving toward a
single  integrated economic  and political system and in which culture
constituted primarily a source of resistance that has  to be  taken into
49 account in planning for change.  The older Marxian school would seem to
have  little difficulty in agreeing with Harry Johnson, in his comment on
Canadian concerns about American cultural hegemony, "You don't have to be
brainwashed by the Americans...to find that a refrigerator is a useful item
of household equipment...Our world  is  riddled with all  sorts of differences
in culture and opinions which are essentially reflections of different
stages of economic development rather than deep-seated divisions among
mankind."50
The cultural materialist perspective, which has been articulated most
forcefully by Marvin Harris,  embraces a richer and less ideological
51
materialism than the  traditional Marxist approach.  The cultural
materialist tradition puts Malthus back on the  stage from which he was
banished by Marx.  Marx held that:  "technology discloses man's mode of
dealing with nature, the process of production by which he sustains his  life
and thereby also lays bare the mode of formation of his  social relations,
18and of  the mental concepts  that flow from them."52  Harris  insists  that  the
modes of production and reproduction determine  (probabilistically) domestic
and political economic  organization and behavior which in turn determine
(probabilistically) the  superstructure (Figure 3).
The cultural materialist framework and research agenda is similar,  in
many respects,  to the  induced institutional innovation framework and agenda.
Objectively determinable behaviorable components  include  (a)  an
infrastructure, defined to  include  the ecosystem and the modes of production
and reproduction;  (b) a structure which includes  the  elements of domestic
and political economy;  and (c) a superstructure that includes both
objectively determinable  (etic) and culturally  specific  (emic) components.5
The Harris  superstructure  is  highly congruent with the  cultural endowments
category in Figure  1.  His  structure component  is  largely congruent with the
institutions component in Figure 1.
The cultural materialism research agenda  is  also quite similar to  the
induced innovation agenda:  "Cultural materialists give highest priority to
the effort to  formulate and test theories  in which infrastructural variables
are  the primary causal factors.  Failure  to identify such factors  in the
infrastructure warrants the  formulation of theories  in which structural
variables are tested for causal primacy.  Cultural materialists give still
less priority to  exploring the possibility that the  solution to
sociocultural puzzles  lies primarily within the behavioral superstructures;
and, finally,  theories that bestow causal primacy upon the mental and emic
superstructure are to be formulated and tested only as  an ultimate recourse
when no  testable etic behavioral theories can be  formulated or when all  that
have been formulated have been decisively designated.  In other words,
19cultural materialism asserts the  strategic priority of etic and behavioral
conditions over emic and mental conditions and processes,  and of
infrastructural over structural and superstructural conditions and
processes;  but it does not deny the possibility that emic, mental,
superstructural and structural components may achieve a degree of autonomy
from the  etic behavioral infrastructure.  Rather, it merely postpones and
delays  that possibility in order  to guarantee the fullest exploration of the
determining influences  exerted by the etic behavioral  infrastructure."54
When one examines  the  research studies conducted within a cultural
materialist perspective, the conceptual similarity with studies conducted
within the induced institutional innovation framework is  further reinforced.
A useful example is  the  attempt by Harris to understand why, in the
southwestern India state of Kerala, the mortality rate of male calves  is
much higher than of female calves, while  in the northern state of Uttar
Pradesh the mortality rate of female calves is much higher than that of male
55
calves.  In both areas farmers  indicated a strong personal commitment to
Hindu prohibitions against the  slaughter of domestic cattle.  They insisted
that they would never kill or starve one of their cattle.  Yet economic
factors were,  in both provinces, powerful predictors of cattle sex ratios.
In Kerala cattle were valued primarily for milk rather than traction;  in
Uttar Pradesh cattle were valued primarily for traction rather than milk.
This is precisely the modification in cultural behavior that would have been
predicted using the micro-economic analysis employed in studies drawing on
the induced institutional innovation perspective.  Compare,  for example, the
interpretation by Hayami and Kikuchi  of the changes in labor relations on
20Laguna rice  farms associated with the introductions  of higher yielding rice
varieties.
In other studies, Harris advances a materialist interpretation of
cannibalism and the Biblical prohibition against pork consumption.  These
"curiosities"  represent test cases  for  the materialist hypotheses.  As Gans
notes,  "if he  can explain such bizarre, apparently  functionless culture
traits by the principle of cultural materialism, then surely he can account
for the main run of cultural  development, the economic rationality of which
is  at least plausible on the  surface." 56
What help can one draw, for extending the induced innovation model to
include cultural endowments, from the  materialist approaches  in
anthropology?  It  seems quite clear that ethnographic studies drawing on a
materialist perspective can be quite useful to economists who are attempting
to utilize the  tools of micro-economic analysis to understand the  impact of
resource endowments and technology on differences  in  institutional
performance and on institutional change.  The ethnographic studies would be
even more useful if their authors were more fully informed in modern micro-
economic  theory and the methodology used in the empirical testing of
hypotheses  generated from the use of micro-economic theory.  Familarity with
57,58
the  "new household economics" literature would be particularly useful.
Neither  the current research output nor  the research agenda of the
cultural materialist school  is, however, likely to provide much information
on the  questions that I have attempted to  raise  in this paper  --  what
guidance can we obtain from anthropology  in attempting to understand how
differences or changes  in cultural endowments affect behavior leading  to
technical  and institutional change?  This  same point has been stated in a
21somewhat different manner by Gans, who notes that  in the cultural
materialist strategy the  "existence of human society and its  fundamental
institutions  is  simply taken for granted and hypotheses  are formulated to
explain certain of its features as  adaptations  to  infrastructural
59 conditions."
Interpretive Anthropology
From the  1920's until well into  the 1960's  there was a continuing
struggle to  resolve the  conflicts between the Boas-Malinowski "cultural
anthropology" school, which focused its attention on the identification of
"culture patterns,"  and the Radcliffe-Brown "social anthropology" school,
which emphasized social  structure.  The main difference between the  two
schools is  that the pattern approach subordinated social structures  to
culture while the structure  approach subordinated culture  to social
structure.  Singer notes that "the structural theory considers an
"explanation" achieved when it  has shown how each part contributes
functionally to  the existence and continuity of a particular type of social
structure while the pattern theory's  desideratum for "explanations" is to
show how each part fits  into an overall configuration or stylistic pattern
of the culture."60
During the  1960's and the  1970's efforts emerged, drawing on a  wide
range of philosophical and social science traditions,  to direct
anthropological theory and ethnographic  research to  "elucidate how different
cultural constructions of reality affect social action."61
Claude Levi-Strauss and Marshall Sahlins have been among the most
outspoken critics of materialist interpretations of cultural  development.
In the work of Levi-Straus concern is  shifted from the burden of history--
22from the role of social structure or social  systems--to the  role of mental
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phenomena as  a source of social  change.6  The evolution of kinship
structure and language  are taken as  the models for social  change.  In terms
of Figures 2 and 3 Levi-Straus  is  a superstructure determinist.
Sahlins, particularly in his  later work, insists  that material forces
play no  independent role  in  the formation of culture--that resource
endowments  and the entire natural world  are  as much cultural constructions
as  ideas  and values.  In Sahlin's words,  "...  anthropology can no  longer be
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content with the  idea that  custom is merely fetishized utility."63  He
dismisses  the conceptual basis of materialist anthropology:  "The material
forces  in production contain no cultural order, but merely a set of physical
possibilities and constraints  selectively organized by the  cultural
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system."64  He suggests,  somewhat more pungently, that materialist theory
assumes  that "manure is  thicker than blood."65
In a more positive tone  Sahlins  argues:  "The real  issue posed for
anthropology by all  ...  practical reason is  the existence  of culture.  The
utility theories have gone through many changes  in custom, but always play
out  the same  denouement:  the elimination of culture as a distinctive object
of the  discipline.  One sees  through the variety of these  theories two main
types....  One type  is naturalistic or ecological...  while the  second is
utilitarian  ...  invoking the  familiar means-ends calculus  of the  rational
human subject."66   But neither the naturalistic nor utilitarian theories
have been able  to  explain fully the anthropological discovery that  the
r67
creation of meaning is  the distinguishing quality of man.
In these more extreme  reactions  to materialist approaches there  does
not seem to be any way to  connect the process  of cultural  change to changes
23in the macro-economic political or historical environment.  Just as
intellectual history runs  the danger of losing its  authority when not linked
to  institutional history, cognitive and symbotic anthropology needs to
maintain a continuing dialogue with the  study of social organization and
institutional change.  At this  stage the  interpretation offered by
interpretive sociology often strikes me  as excessively personal and
idiosyncratic.
An important exception is  illustrated by the effort by Clifford Geertz
to examine  the  formation and impact of  ideology.6  Geertz argues  that
formal ideologies first emerge and begin to  guide social  thought and
political action at the point at which a political system begins to  free
itself from the dominance of received tradition -- "from the direct and
detailed guidance of religious or philosophical canons  on the one hand and
69
from the unreflective precepts of conventional moralism..."  Geertz  argues
further  that it  is  the ability of  "ideologies to render otherwise
incomprehensible  social situations meaningful,  to so  construe them as  to
make  it possible to act purposefully within them, that accounts...for  the
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intensity with which, once accepted, they are held."  Removing the  study
of ideology from the realm of the irrational  or pathological to a phenomenon
that can be treated analytically enables us  to attempt  to understand the
U.S.  South in the nineteenth century, the  interwar political and economic
events  in Germany, Italy and Japan, China in the 1930's  and  1940's,  and the
recent history of Iran and several other Muslim societies as  reflecting
common sources of social, political and economic  stress.  In terms  of Figure
1, Geerts has added substance to relations  (d) and (D).  His analysis
24provides deeper insight  into  the statistical regularities between economic
growth and social tension observed by Adelman and Morris.7
Cultural Change and Development
In concluding this paper  it is useful to  return to  the  original
motivation that has led to  the attempts  to explore  the sources and  impact of
institutional and cultural  change.  The value of social science knowledge is
that  it offers  the possibility of lowering  the cost of institutional change,
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including the  cost of conflict resolution.7  If this view is valid, the
modification of ideology through advances  in social science knowledge should
pay very high dividends.
There have already been important social benefits  from the ethnographic
research conducted by anthropologists.  Ethnographic research, through  its
examination of alternative culture patterns, has made  substantial
contributions to  institutional reform.  Boas used the  results of comparative
ethnographic research to challenge racist views of human behavior.  Margaret
Mead and Ruth Benedict began, in the  1930's and 1940's,  to  interpret  the
relevance of  their studies of other cultures for  the organization and
practices of American family life.
In the United States cultural anthropology exerted a significant  impact
and provided empirically based support for a liberal  reform agenda in social
policy.  It is doubtful that the  interpretations of ethnographic  studies can
again play a similar  role.  Appeals  to  the exotic now encounter greater
skepticism.  Differences between U.S. and Japanese economic performance are
much more complex than earlier appeals of cultural differences suggested.
If we  take  as our research agenda a more rigorous understanding of the
sources and impact of cultural change, what help can be  obtained from
25anthropology?  The response must be ambiguous.  The materialist research
agendas have been valuable in confirming the  impact of resource endowments
and technology on institutional changes.  But the materialist schools,
whether drawing on Marxist or neo-classical traditions, have little  to offer
in helping to understand the  impact of cultural endowments on technical or
institutional change or on the use or growth of resource endowments.
Materialist anthropology has avoided, almost as thoroughly as  economics, the
impact of cultural endowments.
Interpretive anthropology, despite  its tendency to  slip into idealism
and romanticism, places the  explanation and impact of cultural differences
and cultural change at the  center of its research agenda.  Over the  longer
run this effort is  likely to become more helpful  to those of us working in
the  field of development economics than work carried out within the
materialist agenda.  My own perspective, as  suggested in Figure 1, is  that
the relationship among cultural endowments, resource endowments, technical
change and institutional change will turn out to be dialectical rather than
running linearly from culture to  resources, technology and institutions.  In
anthropology a similar view has been associated with the work of Leslie
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White.  Sahlins, in his criticism of White, comments that  "the
technological determinism of culture  in White's evolutionary theory lives
side by side with the  cultural determinants of technology in his symbolic
74 theory."7  In my view this should be considered as a merit rather than a
fault.  Yet the view will be troublesome  to many economists.  It  implies
great difficulty  in resolving the  "identification" problem.
One response to  these conclusions  is  to insist, given the power of the
results  achieved thus  far  from both the micro-economic agenda (push micro-
26economic  analysis of  institutional change as  far  as  it will go)  and the
materialist agenda in anthropology  (explore the  implications  of
infrastructure determinism),  that few gains would be achieved by allocating
additional  resources to  attempts to  understand the  sources and impact of
change in cultural endowments.  This  is  equivalent, however, to  ignoring the
"missing variable" problem.  It  is  important that  interpretive anthropology
continue  to pursue an agenda that will  in time enable us to more adequately
identify the  sources and impact of cultural change.  Only if  this research
agenda is  successful will  it become feasible for anthropologists and
economists  to collaborate  to  incorporate  the role of cultural endowments
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Figure  1.0 The  Induced Innovation model of  the  interrelationships
between changes  in resdurce endowments,  cultural
endowments, technology, and  institutions.
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Figure  2,0  A  Marxian  Model
^The  forces  of  production  and  the  relations  of  production  together  make  up  the
Economic  Base  or  Mode  of  Production.
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40Appendix
Definitions  of Culture
The definitions of culture  in this appendix were selected to  illustrate
the progressive narrowing of the concept  of culture  in anthropology.
1.  "Culture...is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief,
art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by
man as a member of  society."l  (Does not distinguish  social organization and
social institutions  from a general concept of culture.)
2.  "Culture consists  of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for
behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive
achievement  of human groups,  including their embodiments  in artifacts;  the
essential core of culture consists of traditional  (i.e.,  historically
derived and selected) ideas  and especially their attached values:  culture
systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the
other as  conditioning elements  of further action."2
3.  If...society is  taken to be an organized set of individuals with a
given way of  life, culture is  that way of life.  If  society is taken to be
an aggregate of social  relations, then culture  is the  content of those
relations.  Society emphasizes the human component, the  aggregate of people
and the relations between them.  Culture emphasizes the  component of
accumulated resources, immaterial as well as material, which the people
inherit, employ, transmute, add to and transmit." 3
4.  "Culture is not a material phenomenon;  it does not consist of
things, people, behavior, or emotions.  It  is  rather an organization of
these  things.  It is  the  forms of things  that people have in mind, their
models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise interpreting them."4
415.  "We suggest  that  it is  useful to define the concept culture  for
most usages more narrowly than has been generally the case  in the American
anthropological tradition, restricting its  reference to transmitted and
created content and patterns of values, ideas,  and other symbolic-
meaningful systems as  factors  in the shaping of human behavior and the
artifacts produced through behavior.  On the other hand, we suggest that the
term society--or more generally, social system--be used to designate  the
specifically relational  system of interaction among individuals and
collectivities....  To speak, then, of the analytical  independence between
culture and social system is,  of course, not  to say that the  two systems  are
not related...." 5
Note:  A purpose of the Kroeber-Parsons paper was to distinguish the proper
subject matter of anthropology (culture) and sociology (social system).
6.  "Radcliffe-Brown and other adherents of the theory of social
structure  tended to  avoid using the  term "culture" after the  early 1930's.
This avoidance is  based on the claim that  social anthropology studies social
structure, not culture.... 6  the theory of social structure can dispense
with the word "culture"  (because):  it has  incorporated the  culture concept
into the  core of the theory, for  the  theory of social  structure deals with
social relations not simply as  concrete actually existing objects of
observations but as  institutionalized and standardized modes of behavior and
thought whose normal  forms are socially recognized in the explicit or
implicit rules  to which the members  of a given society tend to conform.7
7.  During the  last half century there "has been a ...  shift from an
interest in artifacts  and other external manifestations of material culture
to an almost overriding interest in social culture and in mental culture." 8
428.  "Culture...refers to  the learned repertory of thoughts and actions
exhibited independently of genetic heredity from one generation to  the
next."9
9.  "Culture in the narrow sense  is  the most problematic element in
modern society....0  The independent variable of historical evolution is
not the  economic, nor the  technical, nor  indeed the aesthetic, but the
ethical.  The only meaningful sense of the word "progress" is ethical
progress;  and it  is  in this  sense that  it  in fact prevails when we speak of
the progress from the constraint of ritual  to the  freedom of art."11  The
"means of preserving order...are at the very heart of culture and more
immediately relevant to  its specific creations than the more general need to
12
increase appetitive  satisfaction ....  The abandonment of order in a mad
rush to satisfy appetites is  a true breakdown of culture." 13
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